<ruby id="lvrcx"></ruby>
  • <tbody id="lvrcx"></tbody>
    <tbody id="lvrcx"><nobr id="lvrcx"></nobr></tbody>
  • <tbody id="lvrcx"><div id="lvrcx"></div></tbody>
      <bdo id="lvrcx"></bdo>
      <track id="lvrcx"><span id="lvrcx"></span></track>

        <tbody id="lvrcx"><nobr id="lvrcx"></nobr></tbody>
      1. <tbody id="lvrcx"></tbody>
        1. <menuitem id="lvrcx"><dfn id="lvrcx"><menu id="lvrcx"></menu></dfn></menuitem>

            英國作業 美國作業 加拿大作業

            歷史Essay要求:Historical Investigation of Canada’s Failure at the Battle of Dieppe

            論文價格: 免費 時間:2022-01-18 10:07:41 來源:www.orient-thai.net 作者:留學作業網

            本文是歷史專業的Essay范例,題目是Historical Investigation of Canadas Failure at the Battle of Dieppe(加拿大Dieppe戰役失敗的歷史考察)”,這次歷史調查的目的是回答這個問題:為什么加拿大在Dieppe戰役中失敗了?兩個來源,我將評估策略和培訓燧發槍團的皇家山上,DieppeRaid, 1939 - 1942年由卡洛琳D,一個案例研究的燧發槍團的Mont-Royals檢驗他們的軍事訓練和條令,回憶和反思1942819日的DieppeRaid John s . Edmonson一名老兵講述他在Dieppe的經歷。對戰略和作戰失敗的分析和Dieppe的戰術失敗的主要原因,使本調查對加拿大在Dieppe失敗的原因進行了全面的概述。

            Section One: Identification and Evaluation of Sources第一節:來源的識別和評價

            This historical investigation aims to answer the question: why did Canada fail at the Battle of Dieppe? Two sources that I will be evaluating are Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942 by Caroline DAmours, a case study on the Fusiliers Mont-Royals that examines their military training and doctrine, and Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 by John S. Edmonson, a war veterans account on his experiences at Dieppe. Both an analysis on the strategic and operational failures and a primary account of the tactical failures at Dieppe gives this investigation a holistic overview of why Canada failed at Dieppe.


            Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid 1929-1942 is valuable, with reference to its origin, because DAmourseducational background and experiences are both rooted in World War Two; with her credentials corroborated by a peer-reviewed journal, Canadian Military History. The article was published seventy-three years after Dieppe, meaning there is less bias given the decreased physical and time-based proximity. With respect to its purpose, the article is valuable because it aims to understand the role of military strategy and operations in the tactical failure of Fusiliers Mont-Royals. The articles content is also valuable because DAmours uses a variety of primary historical documents and past scholarly articles as a basis for the case study.

            就其起源而言,《燧發槍山》和《1929-1942年Dieppe突襲》中的戰術和訓練是很有價值的,因為達莫爾的教育背景和經歷都植根于第二次世界大戰;同行評議期刊《加拿大軍事歷史》證實了她的資歷。這篇文章發表于迪埃普之后73年,這意味著由于物理和時間上的接近度降低,偏見更少。就其目的而言,這篇文章是有價值的,因為它旨在了解軍事戰略和行動在燧發槍山-皇家隊戰術失敗中的作用。這篇文章的內容也很有價值,因為D 'Amours使用了各種原始歷史文獻和過去的學術文章作為案例研究的基礎。


            In relation to its origin, the article is limited since DAmours predominately Canadian education confines the article to her Canadian perspective. A major limitation, in terms of purpose, is the use of the Fusiliers Mont-Royals as the case of study.  There is no analysis on the failures of other regiments or the successes of enemy regiments, potentially resulting in overlooked sources of failure given the imbalance of perspectives. The source is also limited in its content because it offers minimal insight into the faults of Canada at Dieppe as a whole, given the scope of DAmours thesis.



            Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 is valuable, with reference to its origin, because it is a primary document written by a Canadian war veteran who experienced the Dieppe Raid firsthand as a soldier in South Saskatchewan Regiment. With respect to its purpose, the document is valuable because Edmonson reflects on his experiences at Dieppe, as a memoir and to bring justice to Canadians who lost their lives at Dieppe.  This minimizes potential political bias. The document is also valuable in its content as a first-person account that includes many valuable details that are absent in secondary documents.


             In relation to its origin, the document is limited because it is not entirely a raw account since  it was written in 1993 with the assistance of Johns son, then revised in 2003. This time gap from Dieppe means some details may be inaccurate. With reference to its purpose, the document is limited due to Edmonsons educational background since he is not a historian. The document is also limited in its content due to potential emotional bias against Canadian or British military leadership given Edmonsons traumatizing experiences as a soldier.



             Section Two: Historical Investigation第二節歷史考察

            The Allied assault on Dieppe, the bloodiest and most controversial Canadian military action of World War Two, was indisputably a disaster. This Canadian-led amphibious raid failed strategically, operationally, and tactically. This nine-hour battle on August 19, 1942 resulted in 3371 casualties, among the 4963 Canadian soldiers involved.[1] This staggering casualty toll has led historians to ask, how did an operation of such scale, wherein Canada played a lead role, fail to such a devastating extent? To answer this question, this paper has undertaken the investigation of multiple sources such as John S. Edmondsons Memories and Reflections on the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942 and Caroline DAmoursTactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid 1929-1942 to account for Canadas failure at Dieppe. It is clear that Canadas involvement in the reckless Dieppe operation was a result of specific strategic failures and limited rehearsal and experience in amphibious operational design. The consequential outcome was Canadas tactical failure at Dieppe, worsened by superior enemy weaponry.

            盟軍對Dieppe的進攻是二戰中最血腥、最具爭議的加拿大軍事行動,毫無疑問是一場災難。這次加拿大領導的兩棲突襲在戰略上、行動上和戰術上都失敗了。1942819日,這場長達9個小時的戰斗造成了3371人的傷亡,其中4963名加拿大士兵參戰如此驚人的傷亡人數讓歷史學家們不禁要問,如此大規模、由加拿大主導的行動,怎么會沒有達到如此毀滅性的程度呢?要回答這個問題,本文進行了多個來源的調查,如約翰·s·埃德蒙森的回憶和反思1942819日的DieppeRaid和卡羅琳D幻的戰術和訓練燧發槍團的皇家山上和多個強固1929 - 1942在Dieppe占加拿大的失敗。很明顯,加拿大參與Dieppe行動是由于具體的戰略失敗,以及在兩棲作戰設計方面有限的演練和經驗。結果是加拿大在Dieppe的戰術失敗,敵人的武器優勢使其雪上加霜。


            In addition to domestic and global political pressures, the lack of active Canadian involvement in the formation of a wider strategic policy for Dieppe forced Canadas participation in a reckless operation. Despite Canadas constitutional right to act independently, the political ramifications and the breakdown of morale as a result of prolonged inaction pushed the Canadian government and generals to blindly support Dieppe[2]. The original version, Operation Rutter, was cancelled due to German discovery of the plan and poor weather, which removed all planned elements of surprise for the attack.[3] Although changes were made to the plan after the cancellation of the original operation, the target remained the same, resulting in a massive security risk. However, the Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten, still pushed forward with the support of Canadian military leadership despite the risk of the German knowledge of the attack. This would explain the heavily fortified beach wall with defensive German concrete barriers and air-tank guns. In fact, as Peter J. Henshaw argues, the intersection of three protracted bureaucratic struggles left the Canadian Army commanders in Britain with unprecedented powers.[4] These conflicts gave senior Canadian commanders full operational freedom to commit Canadian forces to the large-scale raid, wherein the Canadian Army would not be under the command of British officers.[5] With this full and final authority, Canadian officials could have removed Canadian involvement from the Dieppe raid if they deemed it necessary on military grounds. However, even with security and preparation concerns proposed by British generals Montgomery and Paget, and the British Intelligence, Canadian military leadership still fully supported Dieppe.[6] Moreover, the Canadian government was partially responsible for the lack of Canadian input on the strategic approach for Dieppe. Canadians played little to no part in formulating a wider strategic policy for Dieppe, but, this would not have been the case had Canada demanded a voice in the higher direction of war, like Australia.  {discuss what Canadian involvement in formulating the strategic policy would have achieved}. Henshaw asserts, To the Canadian prime minister, shared direction of the war looked too much like a scheme for centralizing power in London.[7] Mackenzie King refused to relinquish the countrys equivalent constitutional status. This lack of involvement would lead to an operational failure due to lack of insight. It was unfortunate that the political and military leadership used their moment of greatest independence and control to ensure Canadian participation at the tragic Dieppe raid.


            Given lack of experience and effective rehearsal, the overly detailed and rigid amphibious operational plan set for Dieppe led to Canadas tactical failure. With the limitations of time and resources, Canadian soldiers and military leadership did not receive sufficient information nor training to accomplish the strategic objectives. The lack of beach intelligence, which had severely underestimated the geographical obstacles and German defenses[8], further hindered the already limited military expertise and tactical knowledge of the Canadian army. Given the complex nature of the operation, Caroline DArmous argues: members of the infantry unit had to master the various technical elements of amphibious operationsthe infantrymen needed to become familiar with cooperation with tanks, the RN, and the RAF.[9] In pre-Dieppe raid drills Yukon I and II, there was limited coordination between different Canadian regiments, despite the great emphasis amphibious operational doctrine had placed on the support of tanks for the infantry troops and pre-aerial bombing.[10] Moreover, there was a lack of systematic defensive tactical training, which would be pivotal given the German fortification at Dieppe.[11] This amplified the faults of Canadas outdated military doctrine, adopted from the British.  DAmours explains, German victory over France in the spring of 1940 highlighted the British Armys slow tempo in action, due to outdated tactics and lack of initiative at all levels, as well as the German Armys superior training.[12] The introduction of machine guns and tanks resulted in a decentralized battlefield, which exposed the flaw of the British autocratic command system at Dieppe, especially given the geographic advantage German troops had at Dieppe. Essentially, when Canadian troops were dispersed, soldiers of all ranks were required to make proper decisions, which demanded initiative, intelligence, and in-depth military knowledge.[13] With inconsistent military training, the pre-Dieppe raid drills especially lacked training on flexibility, initiative, and military instinct for junior leaders, who would be required to take on the role of senior leaders in a decentralized battlefield. However, the essential fault, as Harald H?iback addresses, was that the operational plan for Jubileewas so detailed that it left no room for improvisation once things began to go wrong.[14] A small mistake would lead to the failure of a subsequent regiment, leading to a disastrous domino effect. With poor operational design, the tactical execution was doomed to fail at Dieppe.


            The poor execution of the frontal Dieppe assault was further worsened by insufficient naval and aerial support against superior German weaponry and deficient Allied communication lines.  The Allies relied heavily on the element of surprise in the execution of Dieppe; as David OKeefe explains, the key to success lay in a multi-faceted approach underscored by three intricate pillars namely, surprise, shock, and security.This doctrine was well understood prior to Dieppe, meaning the operational planning fell short of tactical common sense. They lost the element of surprise when the Allies accidentally encountered German naval force before reaching the Dieppe beach, alerting German land forces when they heard the naval fighting. Shock was not achieved by the Allies, with limited aircraft ability to use sudden and suppressive firepower. John S. Edmonson, a war veteran who fought at Dieppe, explains, “… there was to be no heavy bombing of the Dieppe landing areas before disembarking because the Air Force could not guarantee accuracy.Security was not achieved either, with the previously leaked version of the raid, Operation Rutter. The failed surprise attack, in addition to the late arrival of multiple regiments responsible for tanks such as the 14th Tank Army Regiment, exposed Canadian troops to German gunfire upon landing on shore, immediately killing thousands. Most critically, as Mark Zuehlke reasons, they were stymied by superior weaponrythe impartial assessment of Gernealleutnat Konrad Haase, who immediately after the raid acknowledged the gallantry and skill of all the troops engaged in the raid while pointing out the hopelessness of their assignment.The Allies lost one hundred and six aircraft, thirty-three landing craft, HMS Berkeley, and all of the twenty-nine tanks relative to the forty-eight aircraft loss for the Germans, their only significant loss. The failure was worsened by demolished communication lines, which turned the situation hopeless. Officers on Calpe and Fernie never wholly received the messages sent to them, resulting in Major General John Hamilton Robertsdisastrous assumption that the Allies were succeeding. He sent Fusiliers Mont-Royal to take advantage, only to also be annihilated. With a casualty toll just shy of sixty-eight percent, it was evident that superior enemy firepower not only ensured a German victory at Dieppe but also annihilated Canadian forces.

            由于對德國先進武器的??罩г蛔?,以及盟軍通訊線路的不足,Dieppe戰役的執行力進一步惡化。盟軍在處決迪埃普時主要依靠出其不意的手段;正如David O 'Keefe所解釋的那樣,“成功的關鍵在于通過三個復雜的支柱來強調的多方面的方法——即意外、沖擊和安全?!痹贒ieppe之前,這一理論已經被人們很好地理解了,這意味著作戰計劃缺乏戰術常識。當盟軍在到達Dieppe海灘之前意外遇到德國海軍時,他們失去了出其不意的因素,當他們聽到海戰的聲音時,就通知了德國陸軍。由于盟軍有限的飛機使用突然和壓制火力的能力,盟軍并沒有造成沖擊。約翰·s·埃德蒙森,一位曾在Dieppe作戰的老兵,解釋說,“……在登陸Dieppe之前,不會有對其登陸區域的猛烈轟炸,因為空軍無法保證準確?!痹谥靶孤兜摹棒斕匦袆印敝?,安全問題也沒有得到解決。這次突襲失敗,加上負責坦克的多個團(如第14坦克軍團)的姍姍來遲,使加拿大軍隊在登陸海岸時就暴露在德國人的炮火之下,立即造成數千人死亡。最重要的是,正如Mark Zuehlke所解釋的,“他們被先進的武器阻止了……Gernealleutnat Konrad Haase的公正評價,他在突襲后立即承認所有參與突襲的部隊的勇氣和技能,同時指出他們的任務是絕望的?!泵塑姄p失了106架飛機,33艘登陸艇,HMS伯克利號,以及全部29輛坦克,而德國損失了48架飛機,這是他們唯一的重大損失。通訊線路被拆除,使失敗變得更加糟糕,使情況變得絕望??柵搴透柲岬能姽賯儚膩頉]有完全收到發給他們的信息,這導致了約翰·漢密爾頓·羅伯茨少將災難性地認為盟軍會取得勝利。他派燧發槍兵去皇家山乘虛而入,結果也被殲滅。傷亡人數不到68%,很明顯,敵人強大的火力不僅確保了德國在Dieppe的勝利,還殲滅了加拿大軍隊。


            At Dieppe, the Allied forcesstrategic, operational, and tactical failures resulted in the loss of thousands of men. Firstly, Canadas limited participation at the strategic level resulted in a significant lack of insight and common sense at the operational and tactical level, wherein senior Canadian commanders had full control of. Secondly, once Canadian troops had fully committed to the Dieppe raid, they were inherently limited in time and resources, as well as their outdated military doctrine, which resulted in ineffective preparation. Finally, the failed surprise attack with grave mistakes committed by multiple regiments, resulted in a domino effect, worsened by faulty communications lines and superior enemy weaponry. While the Allied forcesfailure at Battle of Dieppe cost thousands of lives as the bloodiest battle of World War Two, it taught the Allies many important lessons on amphibious operations, ensuring success for the next raid. Truly, the Dieppe Raid was a prelude to D-Day, the greatest Allied success in World War Two // Truly, the Dieppe Raid was a prelude to D-Day, a military journey from tragedy to triumph.


            Section Three: Reflection第三部分:反射

            Investigating Canadas failure at Dieppe was a very valuable and rewarding experience. I gained significant insight on the processes used by historians and the challenges they face when conducting a historical investigation. First, my investigation involved a collection of primary and secondary sources. As a completely unbiased interpretation of historical events is impossible, historians must use a variety of primary and secondary sources to piece together inferences to form a well-supported argument or conclusion. I used primary sources, such as a written account by a Dieppe war veteran, to immerse myself in order to gain a deeper understanding of how events unfolded at Dieppe. Combined with several secondary sources such as scholarly articles and books, which provided thorough analysis of Dieppe by historians, I was able to form my own conclusion.



            After collecting sources, I used historiansmethods in my investigation to determine the credibility of each source. I assessed the sources author and their relationship to the subject, the authors intent, the intended audience of the source, and the balance of different perspectives in the work. With respect to the origin, purpose, and content of each source, I determined its value and limitations. During this process, I found that a source that I had selected, David OKeefes One Day in August, the Untold Story Behind Canadas Tragedy at Dieppe, was limited in terms of its purpose and content given its one-sided take on Dieppe, with a focus on the British Intelligences attempt to obtain German code for enigma machines. Thus, I used this source minimally in forming my arguments.


            Finally, after selecting credible sources, I used other historiansanalysis and conclusions to form a more-informed perspective on Canadas failure at Dieppe. However, given that history is not based on purely subjective information like mathematics and science, I recognized that regardless of the source used, there is always an inherent bias. Thus, it is important to use as much as a variety of sources as possible I did so to ensure that my investigation is based off a clear understanding of Dieppe, based on historical records and historical analysis. This experience gave me insight on the dedication required of historians. Overall, in this period where I acted as a historian, I was able to better understand the role of historians in analyzing our past and predicting our future through their understanding of the human race.





            • 社會學Essay格式:Sui...


            • 歷史Essay要求:Hist...


            • 文化研究Essay范文:Ca...


            • 護理學Essay參考案例:A...


            • 政治Essay寫作:Pros...


            • 文化研究Essay范文:It...


            <ruby id="lvrcx"></ruby>
          1. <tbody id="lvrcx"></tbody>
            <tbody id="lvrcx"><nobr id="lvrcx"></nobr></tbody>
          2. <tbody id="lvrcx"><div id="lvrcx"></div></tbody>
              <bdo id="lvrcx"></bdo>
              <track id="lvrcx"><span id="lvrcx"></span></track>

                <tbody id="lvrcx"><nobr id="lvrcx"></nobr></tbody>
              1. <tbody id="lvrcx"></tbody>
                1. <menuitem id="lvrcx"><dfn id="lvrcx"><menu id="lvrcx"></menu></dfn></menuitem>